Introduction
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak in West Africa was first reported in March 2014 in Guinea [1] . In May 2014, Sierra Leone reported its first case in the northeastern district of Kailahun, which shares borders with Guinea and Liberia. By June 2014, the outbreak had spread to neighbouring Kenema district, which is home to the third largest city in Sierra Leone. As the number of EVD cases increased sharply until mid-August 2014, Kenema district became one of the major epicentres in the largest EVD outbreak in history [2, 3] . As of 30 March were five motorbikes and one motorcar to manage case investigation and contact tracing for the entire district as well as southern Kailahun district, which was more easily accessible by Kenema surveillance officers due to road conditions and southern Kailahun's geographical proximity to Kenema. In June 2014, two international epidemiologists were deployed by WHO. By the peak of the outbreak in late July 2014, five more international epidemiologists had been deployed to the district by WHO or WHO's Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) [11] and six additional case investigators were allocated for surveillance in Kenema district by the International Rescue Committee.
Despite intensive efforts to control the EVD outbreak, it is believed that delayed and insufficient contact tracing was partially responsible for the enormous magnitude of the outbreak [12, 13] . To date, there have been very few studies with primary data on contact tracing from the 2013-2016 EVD outbreak even though there is a need to describe the lessons learned so that contact tracing may be implemented more effectively in future outbreaks. To this end, we assessed the performance of contact tracing, focusing on the initial stage of the outbreak, with the goal of understanding the effectiveness and challenges of implementing contact tracing.
Methods (a) Study period and case definitions
We conducted a retrospective data analysis for probable and confirmed cases of EVD and their contacts in Kenema district. Cases that were reported in the national EVD database between 27 April and 10 August 2014 were included for analysis. Even though the last case in the district was reported in February 2015, this study period was chosen because our primary interest was to focus on the initial implementation of contact tracing activities until the peak of the outbreak in the district. We used the WHO case definitions for suspected, probable and confirmed cases of EVD [14] . Suspected EVD cases were not included in our analysis because reclassification of cases upon laboratory confirmation was performed satisfactorily and daily monitoring of contacts was not continued for suspected cases that tested negative. In addition, because of the heightened surveillance for EVD after the outbreak had waned in Kenema district, suspected cases continued to be tested; however, because they were not confirmed EVD cases, the data on corresponding contacts were not available.
We included contacts that were followed between 27 April and 4 September 2014 to account for the 21-day incubation period. The contacts were defined as those who slept in the same household with a case; had direct physical contact with a case (alive or dead) during the illness; had direct physical contact with a (dead) case at a funeral; touched body fluids of a case during his/her illness; touched clothes or linens used by a case; and/or were breastfed by a case [14] . Contacts who became confirmed EVD cases during the monitoring period were considered as cases for the purpose of our analyses. Cases and contacts who did not meet the respective WHO case definition for EVD case or contact were excluded [14] .
(b) Data collection
Whenever suspected or probable EVD cases were reported, case investigations were conducted to obtain their demographic information, clinical signs and symptoms, hospitalization information and epidemiological risk factors using a standard Case Investigation Form (see electronic supplementary material 1). Blood specimens were collected from these suspected or probable cases, rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 372: 20160300 and laboratory confirmation was performed through quantitative reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction as previously described [15, 16] . The data from case investigation were entered in the Microsoft Excel database, which was replaced by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's) Epi Info Viral Hemorrhagic Fever database in August 2014. Both these databases served as the national EVD database maintained by the MOHS. As laboratory results became available, suspected and probable EVD cases were reclassified as either non-cases or confirmed cases, and laboratory data were entered into the Excel database. The mortality outcomes of EVD cases (suspected, probable, confirmed and non-cases) were recorded if they were available.
Upon reclassification of a suspected or probable EVD case to a confirmed case, investigators were dispatched to interview the laboratory-confirmed case (if living and conscious) or family member. Further investigation of those who were reclassified as non-cases was not warranted. During this interview, surveillance officers asked about time of symptom onset of the laboratory-confirmed case, previous contact with other EVD cases, and any other information missing from the previously completed Case Investigation Form. In addition, information about individuals who may have come in contact with the confirmed case since the time of symptom onset was obtained. Although the maximum incubation period for EVD is 21 days [7] , time of onset of symptoms was used since evidence suggests Ebola virus is not believed to spread prior to onset of symptoms. The names of the contacts of confirmed EVD cases, their basic demographic information, relation to the cases, date of last contact, type of contact and healthcare worker status were recorded. These data were entered and maintained in a separate database known as the Contact Line List.
In terms of the data capturing during the 21-day monitoring process, each contact was listed on a separate Contact Tracing Form and assigned to a contact tracer for monitoring. Any person who had contact with multiple EVD cases was required to restart the 21-day monitoring beginning with the most recent date of exposure. Upon completion of 21 days, development of EVD symptoms by contact, or loss to follow-up, the contact tracer submitted the Contact Tracing Form for data entry into the Contact Line List. Thus, in addition to the aforementioned variables, the Contact Line List also contained information regarding completion of the 21-day monitoring period or reason for incompletion. Contact tracing was applied to all patients who entered the suspect triage system, though follow-up daily monitoring of contacts was only applied when a suspected case yielded a positive EVD specimen. Contact tracing data in Kenema district, like other districts, were collected and collated on paper forms and subsequently entered into a computer system, noting the linked case.
No written informed consent was collected, as the data were collected as part of routine surveillance in response to the outbreak. The Kenema District Health Management Team approved the analysis and reporting of data in aggregate.
(c) Analytical approach
To understand the relationship and establish linkages with cases, the cases and contacts were first reviewed in Microsoft Excel. We calculated the proportion of cases that had contacts registered in the Contact Line List, proportion of contacts in the Contact Line List who completed the 21-day monitoring period, and proportion of cases that arose from the Contact Line List. Average number of contacts per case was also calculated. Multivariable logistic regression was performed to compare risk factors for EVD between cases and contacts while controlling for age and sex. Odds ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were estimated. Because some individuals had more than one type of exposure and different combinations of exposure type resulted in a small sample in each stratum, the highest level of exposure was used for classification of risk, similar to that described in Bower et al. [17] . Contacts with laboratory-confirmed EVD tests were treated as confirmed cases. Suspected or probable cases without a final case classification and/or onset date were discarded. All statistical tests were twosided. p-Values of less than 0.05 were considered to be statistically significant. All statistical analyses were performed in SAS v. 9.4 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC, USA). Wherever possible, we also reconstructed transmission chains using yED, a part of the yWORKS freeware solution for graphic visualization (Copyright 2000 (Copyright -2016 
Results
During our study period for cases between 27 April and 10 August 2014, the national EVD database consisted of 1301 individuals, including 641 (606 confirmed and 35 probable) EVD cases, comprising 251 Kenema cases. An additional 198 confirmed EVD cases that were not recorded in the EVD database were later found in the Kenema Contact Line List. While Kenema district registered cases from all over the country (figure 1), 449 out of 839 (54%) confirmed and probable cases were recorded from the district within this period in the two databases. Kailahun district, which was one of the major epicentres in West Africa at the time, recorded 382 confirmed and probable cases, accounting for 46% (382/839) of all reported and registered cases in the database. Out of 449 cases in Kenema, 261 (58%) had case investigation completed (figure 2). Only 198 of 449 (44%) EVD cases had contacts registered in the Contact Line List. A total of 2525 contacts were registered in the Contact Line List for Kenema district. As 449 cases were recorded in the district, the number of contacts per case was 5.6 (CI: 4.7-6.5). Exposure information was available for 2155 (85%) of the registered contacts (figure 2).
There were only a few contacts per case recorded on a weekly basis until the second week of June 2014 (figure 3a). The number of contacts per case increased over time. One individual, who developed EVD symptoms when he was incarcerated, generated 181 contacts. These contacts were included in the calculation of average contacts per case. Kenema district's Contact Line List also contained one individual in Bo district, but it did not have any information about contacts in any other districts. 2256 out of 2525 (89%) contacts in Kenema district completed the 21-day monitoring period during the study period.
Only 6% of the cases (27/449) arose from those who had been previously traced, and all of those cases were reported between early June and mid-July (figure 3b). Moreover, 44% (198/449) of those people identified as cases through the Contact Line List were not listed in the EVD database, with the vast majority of these cases (188/198) having no exposure information.
The demographic and exposure characteristics of cases and contacts as well as results of the multivariable logistic regression are in table 1. Cases were significantly older (30 years old) than contacts (20 years old) ( p , 0.001). Cases and contacts did not differ by gender ( p ¼ 0.557). A higher proportion of cases had touched the body fluids of a previous case (blood, vomit, saliva, urine, faeces) ( p ¼ 0.08) or reported direct physical contact with the body of a previous case (alive or dead) ( p , 0.001) compared to contacts (data not shown).
On the contrary, a significantly higher proportion of contacts rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 372: 20160300 reported exposures that are considered to be lower risk, such as sleeping, eating, or spending time in the same household or room as the case ( p ¼ 0.005). Only 20 out of 191 confirmed and probable cases (70 missing responses) attended a funeral (data not shown). Information on funeral attendance was not available for any of the individuals in the contacts line list. In the multivariable logistic regression adjusting for age and sex, the exposure levels 1 (touching the body fluids of the case) and 2 (having direct physical contact with the body of the case), which are known to be high risk factors, were significantly associated with EVD status (OR ¼ 8.9; CI ¼ 1.2-65.1 and OR ¼ 20.5; CI ¼ 2.7-152.9, respectively).
Transmission chains were created for cases and contacts using yED. Because not all cases could be linked and visualized owing to the lack of access to contact data from early cases in Kailahun district and generally sparse nature of data, we provide the most complete example for Kenema district. Figure 4 shows the most likely transmission between patients in Kenema district at the start of the outbreak period, where limited or no contact tracing data were available, but a review of the location, time and primary exposure variables was adequate to generate an estimate of the line of transmission. It must be noted that while these links appear to be the most likely routes of transmission, the reality is considerably more complex. Cases reviewed sometimes had from two to ten potential exposures within the incubation period (i.e. multiple deaths in a family, multiple family members caring for sick family members), and as such the link selected was based on most likely route (exposure between 8 and 14 days prior to symptoms). Not all cases had onset dates recorded, particularly those in the early stages of the outbreak, where dates of onset were not available; a nearest estimate was used based on the earliest of the following: admission date, laboratory test date, date of death and date of funeral. While this example illustrates the typical uncontrolled transmission with large numbers of fatalities, figure 5 represents data from a cluster 1 year later in Western Area, where concerted response activities reduced the likelihood of further transmission through the isolation of all suspects considered high risk. A notable outcome of these figures is the difference in numbers of secondary cases generated following a case. In the early stages of the outbreak, fatal cases often resulted in exposure for a large number of attendees of the funeral, exacerbating the problem by producing further cases. Furthermore, the contrasting effects of figures 4 (limited or no available contact tracing) and 5 (all contacts were traced and monitored) illustrate that in a setting of more aggressive policies and resources as well as other factors, contacts out-numbered cases and fewer transmission events seemed to occur. 
Discussion
The outbreak in Sierra Leone was related to cases in neighbouring Guinea and Liberia, which identified cases much earlier.
For some months, while EVD cases continued in Guinea and Liberia, Sierra Leone was in a position to prepare its health system. However, much in the same manner in which WHO and leading responders are deemed to have escalated their response too late, Sierra Leone failed to launch adequate surveillance and respond when the epidemic spilled across its borders. The gaps in implementing and maintaining contact tracing in Kenema district are evident in figure 3 . From the onset of the outbreak until mid-June, there were only several contacts listed per case. This is far below the average number of contacts per case reported elsewhere [18 -20] , which indicates incompleteness in listing of all potential contacts of EVD cases. Indeed, in our database, only 44% of cases had contacts recorded in the Contact Line List and were themselves listed in the national EVD database. While the number of contacts per case appeared to increase over time, reflecting improved identification of and/or recording of contacts, such a large number of contacts became difficult to monitor despite the district's prior experience with viral haemorrhagic fever (i.e. Lassa fever). Our estimate that only 6% of cases had previously been identified as contacts indicates that early in the epidemic, the majority of transmission was occurring unmonitored. Together, these estimates indicate that the surveillance system was unable to keep up with the increasing number of cases in Kenema. This is not at all surprising given the limited resources available at the time. When contact tracing was initiated in Kenema district, it was almost entirely sourced from research projects and organizations rather than service organizations. Moreover, the frequency of EVD cases during the first three months of the outbreak far exceeded the average suspected and confirmed Lassa fever cases in an entire year [21] . Despite similar numbers of Lassa fever contacts per case to those seen in the EVD outbreak, the Kenema Lassa fever team did not have the capacity to oversee national contact tracing for Lassa even with this lower incidence. Instead, for non-Kenema districts, the Contact Line List was provided to local health officials in those districts after case investigations were conducted. Further comparisons to Lassa fever are limited, as secondary human-to-human transmission of Lassa fever occurs less frequently than Ebola [22] . The cumulative effect of having a higher frequency of EVD cases resulted in an exponential growth in contacts needing monitoring, and in Kenema district, the response to that growing need for further resources took more time than the outbreak could afford.
In Kenema district, despite the high completion rate (89%) of the 21-day monitoring period, the fact that the outbreak persisted for 10 months in this district indicates that there were significant gaps in case investigation, contact tracing and contact monitoring. In the first months of the EVD emergency in Sierra Leone, the district coordination centre at KGH was the acting coordination centre for all EVD data in Sierra Leone, which created a heavy burden on the small Kenema surveillance team. Case Investigation Forms, when filled out, were sent with specimens from neighbouring districts, primarily Kailahun, and required entry into a primary database. Initial attempts at using the CDC's Epi Info Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHF) application-a data management tool that is specifically designed to integrate data on cases and their corresponding contacts, and that became more widely used as the outbreak spread nationwide-proved challenging at that phase in the epidemic. At the time, only one person was able to enter case and contact information due to the singleuser interface (later changed to multiple users). In addition, uploading data across different locations and maintaining a single-user interface among responders with little or no information technology experience proved difficult [23, 24] . The solution was use of non-relational spreadsheet systems to record case investigation data and contacts separately. This impacted the response team's ability to correlate case and contact data in real-time. In addition, lost or damaged paper forms, illegible handwriting and backlogs in data entry may have Where an individual had more than one exposure, the highest level of exposure was used for the analysis.
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 372: 20160300 resulted in documentation of fewer contacts completing the 21-day monitoring than actually occurred.
We were unable to produce verifiable transmission chains from the contact data information, with the exception of some local familial clusters. Further complicating these chains was the limited sharing of case and contact data between districts, an important gap given the transmission across administrative boundaries by mobile populations often seeking care away from their source of exposure. The data reviewed contain no contact details for cases investigated in Kailahun district. While this data may be available in retrospect, for the purposes of our analysis, use of the data that were rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 372: 20160300 available at the time is important to assessing the temporal context of the situation. While the majority of cases from our dataset had no contact details, many of these were case reports from the neighbouring district of Kailahun, for which Case Investigation Forms were delivered to Kenema on a weekly basis. Within the design of the data collection system, there is considerable evidence that 'case-contact-case' linkages can be established based on specific case exposure variables such as attending funerals or having contact with a known case. Where available, this information provides a good indication of probable or most likely route of transmission, although in highly social communities these exposures can be frequent and assessing the source of infection remains complex. In the event of a death in the family, particularly someone with a large social network and status, there is a high likelihood that many family and friends will attend the funeral and have common exposures, ultimately resulting in large numbers of new cases [25, 26] . This becomes more noticeable when reviewing the transmission chains for earlier cases on the Kailahun-Kenema boundary (figure 4), and significantly different from later events as in the example from Western Area in August 2015 ( figure 5 ). The introduction of Safe and Dignified Burials late in 2015 likely reduced the transmission route associated with attending burials with the exception of individuals who continued to disbelieve the risk despite media attention and advice. At the start of the outbreak, burials still involved direct contact with the deceased as a form of respect, thus generating large numbers of exposed people from any given death. While our study was unable to compare the risk of transmission from burials before and after an intervention, other studies support our hypothesis [27, 28] .
It is generally agreed and accepted that the key to preventing transmission of EVD is effective and rapid control of infected individuals and those with whom they may have had close contact, or case ascertainment and contact tracing [18, 29] . Case ascertainment is dependent on finding and isolating infected patients in a timely manner in order to reduce the potential exposure to family, friends and anyone with whom the index case has had close physical contact. Contact may also be indirect through activities that bring an individual in contact with body fluids of an infected person. In our study, touching the body fluids (i.e. blood, vomit, saliva, urine and faeces) of the EVD case, having direct physical contact with the body of the EVD case, and sleeping, eating, or spending time in the same household or room as the case were all significantly associated with the EVD status.
Contact tracing is an extremely time-consuming and labour-intensive process that requires a substantial amount of resources, such as personnel, logistics, funds and data management tools. At the same time, it requires careful consideration of the local context. Contact tracers and their supervisors are best sourced from the local population, with a good understanding of how contact tracing fits the sociocultural context of the affected population. Effective contact tracing is also dependent on the accurate collection, collation and management of the tracing data, with timely updates of computer systems to match against pre-existing cases and contacts. This places a great dependency on information technology and basic levels of education (i.e. spelling and writing). Ultimately, the quality of data collected is a product of the ability of the contact tracer to extract information, and the willingness of the contact in question to provide that information. As with many outbreaks of EVD, the local population are often ill-prepared for the types of work required in contact tracing, and while locally sourced staff are more beneficial in the field, with a better understanding of cultural contexts, the data collected must be of adequate quality for computerized data entry and comparison activities [24] . This places considerable emphasis on clear and concise written framework, a basic requirement of spelling names and places correctly, and tools designed to complete the task. Despite the best intent in the world, the introduction of expatriates to this scenario can increase the levels of inaccuracy in data recording as a function of limited local socio-cultural understanding.
We note several limitations to our study. (i) Data quality was often compromised because of the collection tools in paper form. Not only must personnel and resources be allocated for photocopying and distributing forms, but information could easily be skipped or entered inappropriately during data collection. Poor handwriting legibility may also have contributed to data quality issues. Additional personnel were required to enter information into a database, creating another opportunity for data to be inputted incorrectly, leading to challenges in ascertaining epidemiological risks and linking cases to contacts.
(ii) The actual numbers of EVD cases and contacts are probably severely underestimated due to limited personnel and resources as well as community resistance. At the onset of the outbreak, there were only five motorbikes and one motorcar to cover the entire district, and additional resources were procured in July and August 2014. As contact tracing in Kenema district heavily relied on the use of personal mobile phones for communication, it was difficult to sustain for contact tracers who did not receive any financial reimbursement. The lack of a robust surveillance system stemming from resource constraints not only resulted in underestimation of the numbers of EVD cases and contacts, but it also likely contributed to misclassification of case and contact status, limiting our ability to carry out a more thorough statistical analysis. (iii) Diversity of names and knowledge of exact age were limited and limiting, and addresses were often absent; therefore, it was difficult to identify individuals based on name, age and residential address. In addition, many people are known by several different names. This made it difficult to ascertain individuals to enable matching between cases and contacts. (iv) No formal interviews were conducted with contact tracers to understand their challenges and offer any recommendations. However, the experience of the authors, all of whom supported the EVD outbreak response in the field, is similar to that reported by Olu et al. [30] , such that lack of community trust, concealing of exposure information, political interference with recruitment of contact tracers and inadequate training were reported by contact tracers as major challenges [30] . (v) Through the process of organizing the data for this study, we found that anecdotal data collected in the field often provided the evidential link between a case and a contact that subsequently became positive. Further follow-up to supplement the information that was recorded as part of the formal case investigation and contact tracing routine could have allowed us to retrospectively attribute the case investigation outcome to the case data with an explanation of where, from whom and when infection was most likely acquired. Our experience is supported by Stehling-Ariza et al. [31] , who comment that surveillance officers were able to collect additional information that had been withheld initially from survivors and family during follow-up interviews [31] .
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We focused on the initial phase of the EVD outbreak because activities that take place during this critical period can ultimately determine the success of outbreak response. We have learned several lessons for future EVD outbreaks, should they occur in a similar context. First, our study supports the notion that the majority of cases observed in the outbreak were associated with very close contact with a case, such as having touched body fluids of a case or having direct physical contact with a case. Our data, along with similar findings from various studies [32] , suggest that contacts may be prioritized after careful risk assessment in resource poor settings. Second, there must be a standardized approach for data management, particularly for an outbreak spanning multiple districts, let alone countries. In 2013-2016 outbreak, multiple tools were used for data management, making it difficult to harmonize data across the three most affected countries [33] . CDC's Epi Info Viral Hemorrhagic Fever application, which is specifically designed to integrate data on cases and their corresponding contacts and to automate the generation of transmission chains, became more widely used as the outbreak progressed. While it was challenging to implement this application in Kenema district for a number of reasons (i.e. a single user system allowing data entry to be performed on one computer at a time; training required to use all functions in the application; and inability to merge data), significant improvements are said to have been made to this application, which makes it promising in future outbreaks [23] . Should different data management tools be used in a single, large outbreak, clear communication regarding data handling and data sharing is needed to overcome the differences in multiple data management systems. Third, it has been suggested that future contact tracing approaches steer away from paper contact tracing forms and move towards mobile tools for case investigation and contact tracing [34] . While none of the study authors has firsthand experience with this technology in an EVD outbreak, in reality, implementation will depend on the social and technological aspects of the location and population affected. As is often the case, a mobile technology solution would be of extremely limited use in an area with a limited telecommunication network. Deployment of an openaccess mobile tool will rely on easily distributed software and trained personnel with a compatible device. Other issues are continuous power to these devices in the field, maintenance of devices, trained personnel to capture, upload and download data and modify tools as needed, trained personnel to manage the data, Internet/mobile connection, and confidentiality. If done right, however, a real-time tool can minimize errors, duplication of work in data entry and other aforementioned issues in data collection and management. Lastly, as a result of the EVD outbreak in West Africa, the guidelines on how to initiate surveillance and contact tracing in the context of an EVD outbreak have been updated by CDC and WHO [7] . As a way forward, countries within the potential area of EVD transmission need to be adequately prepared to both detect and respond to EVD outbreaks in a timely fashion. This is particularly true in the era where a licensed vaccine may soon become available, and the ring vaccination strategy, which has been shown to successfully control an EVD outbreak, relies on effective contact tracing [35] .
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